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Abstract
This article aims to feature the adaptation of three EU's military non-allied states – Austria, Finland and Sweden – to 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy. This is done against the background of official positions adopted during the 
IGC 1996/97 leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, and also within the context of the Cologne Summit of 
June 1999. This article argues that throughout the 1990s the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish endeavours towards 
endowing the EU with a security and military capability run in parallel with legally imposed as well as domestically 
motivated limitations. Chief among these were limitations as to the building up of a defence pillar within the EU and to 
an unconditional sending of national troops abroad on peace enforcement missions. Springing from the concerned 
states' continued adherence to the non-participation in military alliances and non-participation in wars, those restraints 
have precluded Austria, Finland and Sweden from adopting an all-inclusive approach towards the foreign and security 
policy of the EU. In the specific realm of the CFSP, this could be seen in the espousal of a 'limited solidarity'.
Kurzfassung
Dieser Artikel hat das Ziel, die Anpassung dreier militärisch nicht-alliierten EU-Mitgliedsstaaten – Österreich, 
Finnland, Schweden – an die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) herauszuarbeiten. Das geschieht vor 
dem Hintergrund der offiziellen Position, die während der Regierungskonferenz 1996/1997, welche zur 
Unterzeichnung des Vertrags von Amsterdam geführt hat, eingenommen wurde und auch im Kontext des Europäischen 
Rates von Köln im Juni 1999. Dieser Artikel argumentiert, dass während der 1990er Jahre die österreichischen, 
finnischen und schwedischen Versuche, sicherheitspolitische und militärische Möglichkeiten in der EU zu schaffen, 
parallel mit gesetzlich bedingten und auch innenpolitisch motivierten Einschränkungen laufen. Die wichtigsten davon 
waren die Einschränkungen hinsichtlich des Aufbaus einer Verteidigungssäule innerhalb der EU und bezüglich 
bedingungsloser Sendung nationaler Truppen ins Ausland auf friedensstiftende Missionen. Aufgrund der fortdauernden 
Position der betreffenden Staaten, nicht an militärischen Aktionen und in Kriegen teilzunehmen, haben diese 
Einschränkungen Österreich, Finnland und Schweden daran gehindert, einen umfassenden Zugang zur 
gemeinschaftlichen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zu finden. Im besonderen Bereich der GASP könnte dies als 
Standpunkt einer "eingeschränkten Solidarität" angesehen werden. 
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1. Introduction  
After decades of more or less self-imposed resistance towards the European project, Austria, Finland and Sweden 
formally joined the European Union (EU) in January 1995. By the time the Alpine and the Nordic states started to 
seriously deepen their integration approaches, political and security issues had already moved higher on the EU agenda. 
The reactivation of the Western European Union (WEU), the adoption of the Single European Act formalising the 
existence of the European Political Cooperation and, later on, the signing of the Maastricht Treaty endorsing a Common 
Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) contributed to the trend which was to be significantly intensified over the following 
years. It is true that when Austria applied to the then European Community (1989), this tendency was not so pronounced 
as by the time Sweden and Finland submitted their petitions (1991 and 1992 respectively). In any case, paradoxical as it 
may seem, when seeking EU membership, all three militarily non-allied states(1), encountered a prevailing common 
security-oriented mood that was mirrored in the CFSP-related provisions of the Maastricht Treaty. In other words, they 
came across an evolving CFSP as a fait accompli.  
During the accession negotiation process, the Alpine and Nordic applicants endorsed the whole acquis communautaire 
enshrined in the Maastricht Treaty. With the signing of the 1993 Joint Declaration No. 1, they sent a first signal of 
alignment with Brussels’ political collective will while paving the way for a trouble-free integration into the Maastricht’s 
second pillar. The CFSP-related acquis was acceptable in the eyes of authorities in Vienna, Stockholm and Helsinki. On 
the one hand, the end of the East-West bipolarity had allowed these states to endorse a more flexible understanding of 
neutrality, which was now considered consistent with a political allegiance to the making-up of the CFSP. On the other 
hand, CFSP was, generally, found to be unproblematic. Firstly, this was the case because of its intergovernmental 
character which gave national governments enough room for manoeuvrability to accommodate their countries' distinctive 
security solutions. Largely contributing to this, there was the militarily neutral Ireland and, most importantly, Britain. 
The former, after approximately two decades of experience in reconciling integration with military neutrality, had 
secured Maastricht’s promise that the prospective advancement of CFSP “shall not prejudice the specific character of 
certain Member States” (Article J.4.4, known as the ‘Irish clause’). The latter had traditionally conceived collective 
defence tasks as belonging to the Alliance’s jurisdiction and, hence, never allowed the discussion on military and defence 
issues to be brought into the integration dynamics.  
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Secondly, the unproblematic nature of CFSP derived from the ambiguity of the utilized phraseology reflecting the still 
embryonic nature of the second pillar. In effect, no inevitability was contemplated in the Maastricht’s formula which, 
above all, evoked a finalité that could only be pursued by means of a step-by-step approach based on unanimity. Thirdly, 
was also the perceived rhetoric/reality gap dramatically exposed in the Yugoslav conflict where the lack of political 
understanding prevailing among the Twelve and the flawed nature of the common foreign and security policy's structure 
both produced a resounding failure of the CFSP. Finally, those authorities were fully aware that certain loose ends had 
been left during the planned IGC. At that juncture, with their direct influence, they expected to be able to sharpen up the 
CFSP's terms so as to accommodate their security policy specificity and vital concerns.  
Focusing mainly on the post-accession period, this article aims to feature the adaptation of Austria, Finland and Sweden 
to the EU's CFSP between 1995 and 1999.  
It examines their declared full commitment as well as their practical undertakings towards the advancement of the CFSP. 
This is done against the background of official positions adopted during the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 
1996/97 leading up to the signing of the Amsterdam Treaty, and also within the context of the Cologne Summit of June 
1999. The analytical line is drawn at the Cologne Summit since this event marked the start of a new process. As time 
came to reveal, the EU meeting in Cologne opened up a new world which, in the final analysis, was still in the making 
during the writing of this article. More specifically, this gathering sowed the seeds for a cycle of maturation of the CFSP 
which saw its continuation in important European gatherings such as that in Helsinki (December 1999) and in Nice 
(December 2000), and will not be concluded before a final resolution about the EU Constitutional Treaty.  
This article argues that throughout the 1990s the Austrian, Finnish and Swedish endeavours towards endowing the EU 
with a security and military capability run in parallel with legally imposed as well as domestically motivated limitations. 
Chief among these were limitations as to the building up of a defence pillar within the EU and to an unconditional 
sending of national troops abroad on peace enforcement missions. Springing from the concerned states' continued 
adherence to the non-participation in military alliances and non-participation in wars, those restraints have precluded 
Austria, Finland and Sweden from adopting an all-inclusive approach towards the foreign and security policy of the EU. 
In the specific realm of the CFSP, as the article will reveal, this could be seen in the espousal of a 'limited mutual 
solidarity' (i.e. 'mutual solidarity' which did not include mutual defence assistance in case of an attack against a EU 
member state).  
This article makes two general points. The first is that since their arrival in the European family, Austria, Finland and 
Sweden managed to fit into the evolving CFSP commitments. This was principally the case given the tangible efforts 
they put into the process. These efforts were directed at influencing the shaping of the CFSP in order for them to remain 
inside the core thereby participating on an equal footing in all the agreed arrangements despite their distinctive security 
policy stance. The second point relates to the idea that their declared acceptance of ever-more demanding commitments 
has not taken place without contradictions and sacrifices, many of which remained unresolved until 1999.  
In 1995, within the scope of the 'security of the Union' those countries embraced Maastricht’s prospect of ‘a common 
policy, which might lead in time to a common defence'. Nonetheless, the post-accession period saw them consistently 
objecting to an eventual 'militarisation' of the EU either by means of a total merger of the EU with the WEU, or by 
introduction of a mutual assistance type clause into the EU treaties. On the other hand, the militarily non-allied member 
states consented to bind themselves to the Union's spirit of solidarity which encompassed both contributing to and 
benefiting from a collective political synergy generated by the integration process. The highly supportive stance adopted 
during the Kosovo crisis towards the allied EU partners stood out as a shining example of the aforementioned spirit of 
solidarity. Yet, when contemplating the possibility of an attack against a member state, they continued to feel reluctant to 
abandon their war-free and alliance-free orientation to render territorial assistance to a partner in distress. Finally, during 
the IGC, they supported the conversion of the original WEU Petersberg Tasks into EU’s missions. Yet, it was not 
without difficulties that they committed themselves to participate in future EU-led crisis management missions and, in 
particular, in peace-making operations with combat forces.  
While providing evidence of the Alpine and Nordic's attempts at pushing to the limit the latitude allowed by their 
military non-alliance to remain inside the core as regards security and defence cooperation within the EU, the following 
discussion sheds light on three questions. These questions include: How the politico-diplomatic strategy of these member 
states towards European integration in the security domain evolved between 1995 and 1999? To what extent they 
contributed to the progress of the CFSP? What was the major rationale behind their determination in providing the EU 
with an operational capability for crisis management in the scope of Petersberg missions and what sort of difficulties 
confronted them in this matter? 
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2. The Intergovernmental Conference 1996/97 – The First Hurdle   
The IGC became the initial hurdle which the EU's militarily non-allied countries had to cross since, among other things, 
this was projected to give a clearer definition to the content of Maastricht’s second pillar. They had to come to terms with 
knowing the practical limits to which their declared commitment to the advancement of CFSP should be stretched. While 
remaining loyal to a security policy based on freedom from alliances, all of them aspire to full-fledged participation in 
the CFSP dynamics.  
Although bound to the ‘Federal Constitutional Law of 26 October 1955 on Neutrality’, Austria sought to portray itself as 
constructive builder of the Union’s security structures in such a way so as to gain increasing influence within the 
European family. The Nordic states, however, were particularly active during the CFSP-revision process. Finland's 
activism found justification in the country's security drive towards the EU and its historical experience as an isolated spot 
on the fringes of Europe. CFSP presented itself as a means of filling the post-Cold War security vacuum and of securing 
protection against Russia, while allowing the country to get out of a remote geographical corner and to gain visibility 
within integrated Western Europe. In its turn, Sweden's active interest linked to the need to avoid projecting the image of 
half-hearted European or to be seen by other partners as obstructing progress within the CFSP. Nonetheless, this country 
faced a especially adverse domestic climate. The spectre of the 52% on referendum day, the only day there was a 
majority of Swedes in favour of the integration process, continued to haunt the politicians. There were also the 
opposition forces which nurtured the grassroots’ ‘neutrality instinct’ as well as clamoured for withdrawal from the EU.  
2.1. Finland and Sweden   
Since the early days of its accession, Finland and Sweden display the concern of being at the core of integrative foreign 
policy and security dynamics, and, by so doing, to present themselves as active player within the EU. This was a 
particularly crucial issue for Finland, which since the early 1990s had equated the integration process as a security net 
against Russia and, generally, as a way to protect itself from being left alone again.(2) Such historical need to avoid 
being left alone helps to comprehend Finland's interest in keeping solidarity alive and strengthening the ties between the 
Fifteen through the advancement of the CFSP. In this regard, the reasoning was simple: The stronger the EU became 
politically the stronger would be the security effect engendered by membership to the benefit of Finland’s own security.  
Somewhat paradoxically, throughout the 1990's, the Finnish, but also the Swedish, concern to be at the core of 
integrative security dynamics should be connected with the Helsinki and Stockholm's moves to prevent any advancement 
of the CFSP from going as far as the setting up of a common defence pillar in which, under the current domestic and 
external circumstances, Finland and Sweden could not possibly participate. An eventual 'flexibilisation' of the common 
defence dimension, via the introduction of a choice between ‘opting in’ and ‘opting out’ of a defence protocol, was not 
viewed as positive development either. Even though this could preserve the specific character of these countries security 
and defence solutions, it would run counter to their common aspiration of belonging to the integrationist nucleus.  
Anyhow, the IGC emerged as the first test or opportunity for Finland and Sweden to pass from words to deeds with 
respect to improvement of the CFSP. Accordingly, the Nordic states reacted in a prompt fashion. On 25 April 1996, less 
than a month after the IGC was launched in Turin, they presented a joint memorandum as food thought for it. This was 
due to add to the debate on how to further the CFSP with a view to meet the objectives stipulated by the Maastricht 
Treaty, and on what should be the future role and relationship between the WEU and the EU (Memorandum from 
Finland and Sweden, 1996). That memorandum was put forward as a ‘Swedish-Finnish Initiative’ based on the common 
wish to “develop the EU as a peace project” and on the common successful “tradition of active diplomacy, mediation”, 
as well as experience in “UN's activities on the behalf of peace” (Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Tarja Halonen, 1996). Less 
explicitly, though, it was also founded on the shared understanding of the EU as an 'association' or 'community' of 
independent states – a key point of departure typical of these Nordic countries' integration approaches (Report of the 
Council of State, 1995, p. 61) – and on the intention to sustain the prevailing independent defence line.  
It should be noted, that it was the Finns who had originally come up with the idea of converting the original WEU 
Petersberg missions into the tasks of the Union; and had taken the initiative to share it with their Swedish counterparts, 
who had welcomed the proposition. A Finnish diplomat explained Helsinki's strategy in terms of “giving a helping hand 
to the Swedes” since the Finns, at that time, “were more open”(3) It is plausible to argue, however, that there was more 
than an altruistic gesture involved in such a move. By then there was still resentment in Finnish circles over what had 
happened in 1990 when Sweden announced its desire to seek EU membership without prior consultations with Helsinki 
causing a general outcry in Finland.  
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The major reason for the Finns not to have embarked on that CFSP-related initiative on its own appeared to have resided 
within pure political tactics and was derived from the longstanding cautiousness characterising Finnish diplomacy. This 
was, after all, the first serious diplomatic endeavour in the first year of EU membership. Going along with the Nordic 
neighbour would add political weight to the Helsinki arguments surrounding the proposal. The fact that, at the time, 
Helsinki and Stockholm were ruled by Social Democrat governments (headed by Lipponen and Göran Persson 
respectively) with foreign policy posts held by women (Tarja Halonen and Lena Hjelm-Wallén respectively) might have 
also contributed to bringing together the Nordic neighbours.  
Inspired by the “need for the European Union to enhance its role and capabilities in conflict management”, as well as to 
reinforce the linkage between the Union and the WEU in the crisis management area, the so-called Swedish-Finnish 
Initiative boiled down to a basic proposal. This proposal envisaged the revision of Article J.4 of the Maastricht Treaty, 
firstly, through inclusion of “humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and crisis management (Petersberg 
Tasks) into the scope of CFSP as membership tasks”. Secondly, by establishing “a reinforced link between the EU and 
the WEU regarding the implementation of decisions on military crisis management adopted by the EU” with the WEU 
conducting “peacekeeping and crisis management operations...enacted by the EU” and with all contributing EU member-
states participating “on an equal footing in planning and decision-making”. In the latter respect, it was made crystal clear 
that “No capability will be created within the EU for planning, organising or using military resources” (Memorandum 
from Finland and Sweden, 1996).  
The Nordic contribution to the CFSP debate made an impact upon the IGC proceedings to the extent that it ended up 
providing the basis for the sought after compromise in security and defence matters. Largely due to the contribution of 
the Finnish and Swedish proposal, the definition of the CFSP boundaries came to be fenced within peacekeeping and 
conflict prevention; and the division of labour between the EU and the WEU gained further clarification.  
The merit of the revision proposed by the Nordics and the subsequent successful feedback it gleaned from the European 
audience can be ascribed to its versatility. It concurred with the common view that the EU needed to acquire military 
preparedness in case of conflicts in Europe and bordering areas in order to act of its own accord, and to not be dependent 
on assistance from the US. Secondly, it embodied the minimum common denominator between member states who 
aspired to see the EU bolstering its defence dimension and developing into an independent military institution (i.e. 
Germany, France and Italy); and those who gave the primacy to NATO in terms of collective defence tasks and were not 
willing to go beyond military crisis management (notably Britain and Denmark). Finally, it fitted into the ‘in between 
position’ of those countries sticking to a military alliance-free stance (i.e. Austria and Ireland) who, objecting to the 
development of a militarised EU, insisted on a clear separation between the EU and the WEU, and saw the EU role in 
conflict prevention and management as the maximum option.  
By actively proposing a via media, Finland and Sweden managed to give a concrete contribution to the Amsterdam 
Treaty. Understandably so, Finnish and Swedish authorities liked to hold up their initiative as proof of their countries 
predisposition towards being a participative, rather than a passive element, and to play a part in the progress of the CFSP, 
in line with its former endorsement of the Maastricht’s CFSP acquis. On the part of both Helsinki and Stockholm, 
offering a compromise formula for the upgrading of the CFSP provisions was not, however, the primary rationale. The 
joint proposal was originally conceived of as a defensive measure. By stressing the value of soft security issues (i.e. crisis 
management and conflict prevention), the Nordics endeavoured to distract their partners’ attention from the maximalist 
approach of the federalist-minded states endorsing the vision of a EU with a defence pillar. Anticipating, to a degree, 
renewed internal pressures to set-up a schedule for a gradual integration of the WEU into the EU, Finland and Sweden 
advanced a minimalist approach regarding the future development of the CFSP. This approach was deemed to help 
Finnish and Swedish negotiators avoid the debate of collective defence without giving the impression of acting as a 
hindering element. Most important of all, it was intended to enable the Nordic countries' participation within the core of 
the Union’s developing security and defence dimension to coexist with their continued adherence to military non-alliance 
and independent defence.  
Finns and Swedes knew all too well the existence of different dispositions regarding defence integration among 
traditional members of the Community. By 1996, they felt that a minimalist proposal would strike a common chord with 
British representatives, who had traditionally contended for maintaining defence-related issues within NATO 
jurisdiction. Parallel to this, it was commonly held in Helsinki and Stockholm that, for years to come, Washington would 
never accept the integration of the WEU into the EU, as a result of which they would be forced to give the EU non-
NATO members security guarantees through the backdoor.  
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It should be stressed that in calling for an improved EU role and capability in military conflict management, the Nordic 
countries, endorsed a leaner approach towards the WEU Petersberg Tasks. In their Memorandum, besides the 
unproblematic humanitarian, rescue and peacekeeping missions, they only referred to crisis management in general 
terms. Originally, then, they did not use the expression ‘tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including 
peacemaking’ as laid down in the 1992 WEU Petersberg Declaration (Petersberg Declaration, 1992).  
For domestic audiences, the message conveyed in the presentation of the joint proposal was one expressed in even a 
more lenient and vague language. No direct or indirect mention was made to Petersberg Tasks. Instead, it was advocated 
that the EU must “...for the purpose of the Common Foreign and Security Policy...be in a position to apply the whole 
gamut of instruments, from conflict prevention measures of various kinds to armed peacekeeping actions”. The emphasis 
accorded to the need to improve the EU role in military crisis management (as spelled out in the memorandum) was 
replaced by a particular emphasis on the peace-oriented nature of the (future) security and defence integration. The latter 
is subtly introduced as a “European peace and integration process” while the EU is presented as a “peace process”. On 
the other hand, the proposal for a strengthened EU-WEU relationship is tempered with reference to “a closer linkage 
with the peace-promoting activities of the Western European Union” as well as with the portrayal of this military 
alliance’s activities as resting on “peacekeeping actions, crisis management and humanitarian aid”. With more clarity and 
in order not to give rise to undesired criticism from opposition forces (especially from the Left and Centre Parties 
existing in both countries), a separation was drawn between cooperation in crisis management and collective defence 
arrangements. In addition, participation in future armed peacekeeping missions was made dependent upon a UN or 
OSCE mandate and conditioned upon a national decision. Finally, a merging of the EU with the WEU was rejected for 
not being consistent with Finland’s and Sweden’s military-non-allied stance (Lena Hjelm-Wallén and Tarja Halonen, 
1996)  
Although the utilized terminology in the drafting of the joint proposal had been carefully kept within the bounds of what 
the Nordic states could accommodate in light of their specific security policies and their national law governing 
participation in international operations, there were certain attendant risks. The essentials of the proposal revolved 
around the concept of Petersberg Tasks whose scope tended to be more demanding in military terms since it 
encompassed peacemaking with combat forces. Hence, significant difficulties could arise in case this 'harder' end of the 
crisis management spectrum turned out to be over-emphasised in the amended Treaty thereby raising the threshold of the 
projected EU military capability.  
The Finnish and Swedish leadership were, of course, aware of these risks. But, again, pragmatism and tactical 
considerations pushed the strategy forward. In Finland, where the idea was originally brought up, there was a consensual 
feeling running through political quarters that it would be better for Finland to come up with a concrete proposal early 
thereby endeavouring to shape the outcome of the CFSP debate, rather than to be compelled to accept other member 
states' proposals. In this case, Finland should draw a line as to how far the country would be prepared to go. If that were 
not possible, it would be far more advisable for them to be pragmatically active and to take the initiative, 
notwithstanding. The possibility of separating humanitarian and rescue tasks from peacemaking or peace enforcement in 
the proposal was pondered in Finnish circles. Eventually, this possibility was dismissed.  
For tactical reasons, Helsinki was determined to avoid the impression that its representatives were attempting to block 
the process of creation of something new or that they only wanted to do things in the country's own interest. Advancing 
with a geometrie variable for the Petersberg Tasks was, furthermore, likely to jeopardise the success of the concerned 
diplomatic initiative. As Ambassador Antti Satuli, elucidated: “Proposing less than the Petersberg Tasks would have led 
to failure because the majority of the EU member states were committed to the WEU. Moreover, we thought that in the 
long run it would be possible for us to take over the tasks of WEU except Article V.” Much in the same vein, Elina 
Kalkku, the Minister-Counsellor of the Finnish Mission to NATO, asserted: “Petersberg Tasks were considered a 
package. Either you put that package on the table or you don’t” – words which clearly confirmed the idea that, from the 
Finnish perspective, drawing a line between 'soft' and 'hard' Petersberg Tasks was feared to prompt an unwelcome debate 
over defence the eventual unfoldment of which and end-result Helsinki could neither contain nor block(4).  
In the later stages of the negotiation trade-offs for the revised Treaty, the language became undesirably more forceful 
thereby featuring “tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making” as an integral part of the 
CFSP’s range of possible missions (Article J.7.2 of the Amsterdam Treaty).  
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What had begun as a pro-active and pre-emptive strike, in fact, finished by having a boomerang-like effect detrimental to 
the Nordic initiative-takers (but also to Austria and Ireland). The more combative element conveyed in the Amsterdam’s 
Treaty phraseology confronted the Nordic authorities with 'harder' tasks and scenarios than those they had formerly 
envisaged. For example, it was assented in Helsinki that the new CFSP subparagraph 2 of Article J.7 could be ultimately 
interpreted as allowing the EU to implement UN non-mandated peace-enforcement missions. This was a scenario in clear 
conflict with the domestic law governing the sending of troops abroad – the 1995 Act on Peacekeeping – in force at the 
time when the Treaty was ratified by the Edskunta. Under this Act, Finnish troops’ participation in a given international 
operation required a mandate from a representative regional body be it the UN or the OSCE not to be considered a 
military intervention. By virtue of the fact that peacemaking with combat forces was converted into one of the Union’s 
security tasks, worries were expressed in Helsinki about dangers associated with the EU evolving into a situation where 
it could conduct crisis management missions independently from the UN or the OSCE.  
Although bound to a more liberal legal framework with respect to participation in international operations, Sweden also 
ran into potential difficulties when it sanctioned the insertion of Petersberg Tasks in the scope of a CFSP. Those 
difficulties arose, once again, from the peace-enforcing measures in the Petersberg Tasks concept and from the 
possibility of the EU gaining an independent role in the implementation of such operations. The existence of a UN or 
OSCE mandate, more than a legally formal prerequisite, has for a long time been a political conditio sine qua non in 
Sweden for sending personnel abroad. It was understood, therefore, that the country could participate in Chapter VI-type 
operations implemented by the EU or in any peace enforcement operation conducted by the EU under UN authorisation. 
Highly problematic, however, was the scenario in which the EU led a peace enforcement operation in the absence of the 
Security Council's resolution. Regardless of the fact that such a scenario had been pondered by Swedish foreign policy 
decision-makers, it was placed on the back burner for being considered too remote. Just as important, the new Treaty 
stipulated safety mechanisms (i.e. the right to exercise veto and constructive abstention) to which Sweden could resort 
whenever a perceived conflict between a Union's decision and national foreign and security vital issues arose.  
Having been in the origins of the achieved progress in the CFSP, in the aftermath of the IGC, Finland and Sweden took 
in the new acquis with all the attendant problematical perspectives. From the Nordic standpoint, such perspectives were 
something that they had to live with in order to remain in the core of the EU. To accept Amsterdam's provisions, faute de 
mieux, represented the possible compromise which enabled the Nordics to reconcile EU solidarity with domestic 
restrictions. This, however, seemed to have been made with the mental reservation that in the foreseeable future, the EU 
would not be equipped to implement enforcement operations. It would have to rely on NATO and, consequently, those 
operations would become NATO ones. Placing emphasis on the softer side of Petersberg Tasks rather than on worst-case 
scenarios, the Nordic official interpretation was that engagement in the EU-enacted military crisis management in the 
scope of Petersberg Tasks was, by and large, unproblematic. This was so mostly given the intergovernmental nature of 
European crisis management as reflected by the fact that consensus was required for the initiation of a given operation, 
and by the fact that each country retained the sovereign right to participate. One the other hand, there was also the 
safeguarding principle of constructive abstention under which Finland and Sweden could abstain from taking an active 
part, whenever vital issues were at stake, while not hindering others from going ahead.  
2.2. Austria   
Equally determined, as its Nordic peers, to belong to the leading group in the central areas of integration, including 
security policy, Austria also used the opportunity of the IGC to portray itself as a constructive partner. For Austria, no 
contradiction in terms existed between participation in the building up of a common foreign and security policy and the 
continued adherence to military neutrality. Earlier commitment to CFSP was reflected in the introduction of 
constitutional changes to formalise the country’s participation in CFSP on the basis of Title V of the Maastricht Treaty. 
The new Article 23f(1) of the Austrian Federal Constitution came to allow Austria to participate in measures involving 
interruption, partial or complete reduction of economic relations with one or more non-EU countries. The comments of 
the government of the day pointed out that this article enabled the country to take part in sanctions, notably ones of an 
economic nature, adopted within the CFSP framework (Paul Luif, 1998a, p. 125).  
As the conflict in Yugoslavia unfolded on Austria’s doorstep, highlighting the tangible weakness of the EU to tackle 
conflict situations, in Vienna there was ample awareness of the need to overcome deficiencies in European crisis 
management. To this end, as early as 1995, the country endorsed a security model under which the EU, in close 
cooperation with the WEU, employed “the instruments developed by the WEU under the heading of ‘Petersberg Tasks’ 
for peacekeeping, peace-enforcement and humanitarian operations as well as search and rescue in accordance with the 
provisions of the Charter of the United Nations in the interest of peace and European security” (W. Schüssel, 1995).  
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Vienna was informed of the Northern Initiative before it was formally publicised in April 1996 during the Irish 
Presidency. The proposal centred on European crisis management with peace-enforcement as its most far-reaching 
responsibility, was judged as being politically acceptable. This was the case despite the fact that, by then, the country 
was not allowed by law to participate in EU-led peace enforcing actions without a UN or OSCE mandate.  
From the point of view of Austria, on the whole, participation in the Petersberg Tasks was not considered problematic. 
These tasks were both wide-ranging in scope and defensive in concept. The important decision to engage in a given 
mission was exclusively based on free choice volition and individual assessment. The ‘Irish clause’ and constructive 
abstention existed as safety mechanisms formerly introduced in the Maastricht Treaty. These were believed to enable the 
country to keep aloof from any decision contrary to military neutrality. Not least important was the involvement of 
Finland, and especially of Sweden – to whom Austria felt closer and whose example it tended to look upon – which 
stood as a stamp of feasibility for the engagement of militarily non-allied states in Petersberg missions.  
In addition to all this, it soon became apparent to the Viennese authorities that the Petersberg Tasks were the new 
challenge of the security integration process in which Austria wished to participate fully and on an equal footing 
alongside its other peers. In the hopes of a context for a growing utilisation of WEU’s operational capacities by the EU, 
Austrians declared themselves ready to contribute to those tasks via the units of the national army especially prepared for 
peacekeeping and crisis management (vorbereitete Einheiten) (Patrice Buffotot, 1997, p. 37.) Another weighty argument 
in favour of the novel CFSP element, as advanced in the spring of 1997 by the then Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
Wolfgang Schüssel, rested on the idea of Europe gaining some sort of security self-sufficiency vis-à-vis the United 
States. Speaking to a NATO audience, he declared: “Europe must develop its own capacities in the field of crisis 
management, in a very substantial way. We simply cannot count on our American friends and partners bailing us out 
every single time we run into trouble!” (Wolfgang Schüssel, 1997)  
All in all, in light of a more flexible interpretation of residual neutrality obligations, participation in crisis management, 
the sending of Austrian armed personnel abroad and future involvement in a Union’s peace enforcement capability 
seemed to not encroach on the country’s Federal Constitutional Law on Neutrality. This is not to say that there were no 
strains stemming from Austria subscribing to the novel membership tasks. By the time Austria signed the Amsterdam 
Treaty, national consensus regarding the country’s inability to commit troops in enforcement missions without a UN or 
OSCE mandate still endured. That being the case, the country’s involvement in an EU-led peace making operation, as 
ultimately envisaged in the revised Treaty, lacked both political and legal domestic legitimisation. At that moment, even 
if it was possible to send a contingent to a peace-enforcement UN-authorised operation this did not necessarily mean that 
Austria would feel inclined to dispatch military personnel and, by extension, was ready to fight.  
Despite the difficulties implicit in an ever-increasing participation in a upgraded CFSP, Austria took in Amsterdam's new 
instruments such as the policy planning and early warning unit, the appointment of the High Representative for the CFSP 
and a stronger EU-WEU cooperation. Linked to the latter aspect, the basic fact remained that the incorporation of the 
'Petersberg Tasks' into the revised Treaty of the European Union was a fitting response to help to develop European crisis 
management (Viktor Klima, 1997).  
At this stage of the discussion it should be noted that the Austrian position, throughout the Treaty-revision period, 
followed a pragmatic line. Authorities in Vienna wanted to preserve the central military function of neutrality. At the 
same time, they were predisposed to pay the price for allowing the Union to develop crisis management capabilities 
which was considered a matter of special interest for a country in close proximity to a conflict area (i.e. the Balkans). The 
cost of the preservation of military neutrality implied the acceptance of engagement in the full range of Petersberg Tasks. 
This acceptance was made possible with a constitutional amendment to Article 23f of the Federal Constitution, adopted 
in the summer of 1998, as a result of which Austria was allowed to participate in peace-enforcement actions on the basis 
of EU decisions – besides that of UN and OSCE resolutions. By then, Austrians could contemplate participation in the 
EU enforcing peace efforts without the authorisation of the UN or the OSCE provided that the necessary consensus 
amidst the EU member states was achieved. (Paul Luif, 1998b, p. 96). Subsequent to official acquiescence of the 
country's involvement in the total spectrum of Petersberg Tasks, Klima’s government issued a number of declarations 
stating that Austria desired to concentrate on the lower level of the Petersberg Tasks, and that these tasks should be 
brought in line with the current understanding of neutrality.(5)  
Austria was to take over the EU Presidency from Britain on 1 July 1998. Putting aside its obvious historical significance, 
since this was the first time Austria held the EU Presidency, such an opportunity placed Vienna in a somewhat precarious 
position. Could a nation legally attached to permanent neutrality, (i.e. not being a member of NATO or WEU) and 
profoundly divided in governmental terms on security policy be effective in managing the agenda of the Union in the 
field of CFSP?  
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By the time Austria stepped into the role of the Presidency, the EU had completed a deepening phase bringing about a 
qualitative advance in the CFSP which was still awaiting ratification by national parliaments of the member states and 
implementation. It was logical, therefore, that Vienna could reasonably consider its main task as that of keeping the 
CFSP ship on course and to seamlessly hand it over to the Germans (Wolfgang Schüssel, 1998, p. 87).  
This course of action was, indeed, in the best interest of the Federal Government in Vienna for whom CFSP had become 
a thorny internal issue to tackle given the diverging views held by the two coalition parties (Social Democratic Party and 
Conservative Party) as to the limits of the country’s participation in the Union’s defence dimension. The actual fact that 
nothing extraordinary was to be expected from the first militarily non-allied newcomer in taking over the EU Presidency 
was indicated by the list of Austrian chairmanship priorities in which no allusion was made to the CFSP. (Kurt Richard 
Luther and Iain Ogilvie, 1998, pp. 87-95)  
Two developments reflected the Austrian effort to keep the CFSP ship on course. One was the promotion of the 
discussion of EU’s security role within the informal meeting of EU leaders at Pörtschach in October 1998. The other was 
the announcement of support for the British proposal on the merger of the WEU’s political functions into the EU. A 
retrospective and critical analysis as to how things evolved in the CFSP, nonetheless, shows that the work orchestrated 
by Austria could have gone almost unnoticed, if it were not for the unexpected shift in London's attitude towards the 
military role of the EU; and the subsequent Franco-British understanding in St. Malo one week before the closing Vienna 
European Council.  
3. From Amsterdam to Cologne – The Unexpected Turn of Events   
The St. Malo breakthrough gave immediate rise to a commonly acclaimed impetus for the European debate on common 
security and defence policy. Besides the “effective application of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy 
instruments following the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty”, the “continuation of reflection on the development 
of a European security and defence policy” found its place in the so-called ‘Vienna Strategy for Europe’, as enshrined in 
the Presidency Conclusions. Not least important, the closing summit of the Austrian Presidency also welcomed “the 
intention of the WEU to conduct an audit of the assets available for European operations” in line with the expressed 
general agreement that “in order for the European Union to be in a position to play its full role on the international stage, 
the CFSP must be backed up by credible operational capabilities” (Austrian Presidency Conclusions, 1998).  
The call for the development of a functioning CFSP underlying the ‘Vienna Strategy for Europe’ was to steer the path 
towards the endorsement of new common resolutions making the recently forged commitments in Amsterdam look ‘old’ 
even before they saw their full implementation. In fact, approximately one month after the Amsterdam Treaty entered 
into force, the European family gathered in Cologne and ventured upon additional steps aimed at the strengthening of the 
EU security dimension. The impact of the Kosovo war, where NATO Allies had fought against Milosevic cannot be 
overlooked in as much as it ended up galvanizing the collective political will to accept deepened joint commitments in 
the field.  
The Franco-British Initiative had changed the setting in which Austria, Finland and Sweden had been operating since 
their entry into the Union. Until St. Malo, the militarily non-allied governments counted on Britain to sustain the 
historical defence taboo within the integration process. The forward-thinking approach embraced by Blair at St. Malo, in 
opening up the Pandora’s Box of the European security and defence integration debate, appeared to announce additional 
difficulties for the Social Democrats in Vienna, Helsinki and Stockholm now subject to pressures from both inside and 
outside their countries.  
When the Finnish and Swedish foreign-policy makers forged the proposal for the IGC in 1996 and a year later signed up 
to the Amsterdam Treaty, they were certainly not expecting things to develop so quickly. The Nordic states could not 
possibly have anticipated the new British thinking on European defence as conveyed by the Anglo-French Declaration of 
St. Malo and the implications this was to bring to the EU security and defence integration dynamics. Nor could it foresee 
the outbreak of the Kosovo war which added stimulus to the strengthening of the EU military role. Against this 
background, Finnish authorities started to show some anxiety about the pace and direction of the EU defence dimension, 
and to adopt a more reactive, rather than a proactive posture. Symptomatic of such nervousness was the fact that the 
Finnish authorities began to have problems with the language used in official EU declarations. The first striking example 
was linked to the working out of the Declaration of the Council of General Affairs on NATO's military campaign against 
Serbia issued at the end of April 1999. To the surprise of many at the table, the Finns vehemently opposed the 
characterisation of that action as 'justified' or 'necessary' (as endorsed by the British among others) demanding that the 
word 'warranted' should instead be used. Once the language problems were resolved, Helsinki had no further difficulties 
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Further indicators of apprehension were to surface again in the course of preparations for the Cologne Summit. Amidst 
the clamour of the ongoing war in Kosovo and seizing Britain’s more relaxed attitude regarding a EU military role, the 
German Presidency sought to sustain the momentum of the defence debate. Towards this end, and on its own initiative 
(with the back-up of France, Spain, Belgium and Luxembourg) discussions over the inclusion of the WEU Article V into 
the EU were pushed ahead with the setting up of a collective defence arrangement in sight. In such particular 
circumstances, Finland and Sweden went through great pains to prevent it from seeing the light of day and to limit 
further progress on the security and defence front within the parameters of what had previously been agreed upon in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. Austria also endeavoured to stop a collective defence drive by aligning themselves with the Nordics 
and Ireland.  
It is interesting to note, however that Vienna's representatives tended to be much less outspoken that the their Nordic 
counterparts. Such an Austrian reticence should be primarily understood against the backdrop of the security policy-
related breach existing within the governmental coalition and the resulting difficult bargain between the Social 
Democrats and the Conservatives which only allowed for a minimalist consensus. Additionally, the Austrian delayed 
approach was inspired by politico-diplomatic tactics. The negotiators involved in preparation of the Cologne European 
Council were instructed to remain silent and to let themselves go along with the other partners. In the domestic arena, 
this enabled eventual decisions in the security and military fields to be sold as a result of Austria having been forced into 
the EU ‘mould’.  
An exception to the discreet profile adopted by Austria in the context of Cologne can be found in a concrete initiative of 
the Social Democrat Federal Chancellor, Viktor Klima. This initiative, to be understood in light of the approaching 
European Parliamentary elections (scheduled for 13 June 1999) gained substance in the ‘European Council Declaration 
on Strengthening the Common European Policy on Security and Defence’, where on Klima's insistence, the word 
'neutral' was explicitly featured in the text. The use of the old ‘neutrality card’ was part of the Social Democrats’ 
preparations for political bargaining with the Conservatives which was expected to take place after the autumn general 
elections. It sent a clear signal that opposition against an eventual NATO membership stood fast, and that any endeavour 
in that regard would be met with fierce resistance.  
The Alpine and the Nordic states applauded the final common resolution adopted à la Quinze, which did not encompass 
a common defence agreement, but was confined to the enhancement of the EU security policy so as to allow Europeans 
to gain a fitting crisis management capability. In this perspective, they accepted the transfer of the WEU functions 
necessary for the purpose of conducting the Petersberg operations and the setting-up of common security planning and 
decision-making structures. The endorsement of the strengthening of a common European Security and Defence Policy 
(ESDP), and the development of a EU-led military crisis management capacity were not seen as qualitative steps towards 
common defence. On the whole, they were viewed as a continuation of the 1996 Swedish-Finnish Initiative with the 
stress accorded to the ESDP being linked to the objective of seeing the Union taking up an enhanced role in the crisis 
management area.  
Within the Cologne Summit's context, although the Nordic and Alpine states saw their security specificity validated, and 
their participation on an equal footing in the EU-led crisis management safeguarded, the work ahead towards the framing 
of a common defence policy foretold politically trying times. The possibility of the EU acquiring autonomous capacity to 
conduct the full range of Petersberg missions was given even further relevance. The creation of multilateral structures for 
the purpose of discussing defence issues and the establishment of a military staff received wide support. A closer 
cooperation with NATO, in order for the EU to effectively implement its operations, was unanimously endorsed.  
The eventual development of the three aforementioned points, now high on the EU agenda, was especially problematic 
for Sweden and Finland. On the part of the latter, the sight of seeing the country participating in a EU-led peacemaking 
operation with combat forces, without a UN mandate, remained constitutionally unacceptable. The setting-up of a 
permanent Military Committee in Brussels, as well as of an EU Military Staff, raised particular concern amidst the 
Swedish political leadership. Military cooperation within the framework of the Alliance’s PfP had been somewhat easy 
to justify domestically by virtue of the fact that it proceeded at an exclusive bilateral level and in line with the country's 
long-established peacekeeping vocation. Cooperation on issues with defence implications within the Union’s (projected) 
multilateral structures presented itself as a completely novel practice. This was a practice that proved much more difficult 
to bring before an ill-disposed European opposition and public opinion which was originally led to believe integration 
stood for an Internal Market. For both Nordics, a development which was fraught with many challenges sprang from the 
hoped-for closeness and transparency between the EU and NATO in the implementation of EU-led crisis management. 
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Despite committing itself to the trying developments agreed upon in Cologne, as part of the emerging ESDP, Sweden 
and Finland fiercely stood up against any audacious step forward in the military field. Unwillingness to see the military 
dimension rapidly moving ahead induced these countries to not only focus on the lower end of those missions, but also 
led them to draw its peers' attention to the importance of the civilian side of crisis management and the necessity of 
keeping the right balance between the civilian and military components of the CFSP.  
4. The Commitment to the CFSP: A Case of Limited Solidarity   
The common ground finally agreed upon in Cologne was not linked to defence capacity, but rather to military capacity 
centred on crisis management. This permitted the militarily non-allied Nordics to continue to participate in the evolving 
CFSP both fully and in a spirit of solidarity. Incidentally, in the name of solidarity, a few months before the European 
Council in Cologne, the Nordic and Alpine authorities gave political and diplomatic support to NATO military 
intervention against Serbia. Helsinki, Stockholm and Vienna did not officially condemn Alliance bombing, despite 
lamenting that the action was taken without a UN mandate. A clear understanding was expressed by the Austrians, Finns 
and Swedes, as to the necessity of NATO actions, in unison with European Allied members within the frameworks of 
both the EU and the WEU. In the Declaration of the Council of General Affairs issued at the end of April 1999, the 
Alliance's military campaign against Serbia was qualified as "warranted". In the formulation of the WEU Bremen 
Council Declaration, all of them sent an unprecedented signal of political alignment with Brussels. A Swedish diplomat 
remarked that “had Sweden not been a member of the EU, we would have deplored the actions taken by NATO tout 
court. It was the fact that we were bound to EU solidarity that made us take that line.”(6) This reasoning can surely be 
applied to the Austrian and Finnish cases.  
With the question of mutual assistance arrangement formally pending, the meaning and implications of ‘mutual 
solidarity’, which was supposed to guide the member states’ conduct as regards the Union's security policy as stipulated 
in Maastricht, did not receive further elucidation. What the principle of 'mutual solidarity' should imply in the event of a 
threat and/or attack against any member state continued to be left at the discretion of the involved European 
governments.  
Subsequently, there was no certainty as to how and to what extent the Alpine and Nordic states would ultimately deal 
with potential threats or crises affecting EU member states. Until 1999, from the standpoint of the countries being 
discussed, no formal issued declarations indicated their preparedness to surrender their free-alliance and free-war 
tradition in favour of 'mutual solidarity' in the territorial defence domain. Amidst governing circles in Austria, Finland 
and Sweden, the ‘density’ of cooperation achieved thus far did not allow for indifference vis-à-vis a given partner in 
distress. Far reaching political solidarity (encompassing a wide range of measures from political declarations to 
economic sanctions) was, therefore, openly contemplated in clear departure from their traditional policies of neutrality. 
This same situation, however, was widely interpreted as not compelling states to translate their solidarity into military 
action.  
In fact, both in Finland and Sweden and as late as 1999, the possibility of military intervention to defend a member 
state's territory under attack was resisted.  
In the Finnish case, a governmental resolution of 1997 stipulated that “Finland cannot be impartial in a conflict between 
the Union and a third party”, (Report by the Council of State, 1997, p. 48) which may be said to imply a promise of far-
reaching solidarity. Yet, however great and multifaceted this solidarity was, it fell short of involvement in military 
intervention. Alluding to this, a Finnish diplomat observed: "Whether participation in crisis management automatically 
involves us in a collective defence of a member state victim of aggression? There is no automatism on that. It would 
depend on the circumstances. At present, participating in the defence of other member states is excluded.”(7) Along these 
lines, it was non-belligerency rather than common territorial defence that constituted the maximum allowable sacrifice 
which Finnish authorities were prepared to envisage in the name of the Union’s ‘mutual solidarity’.  
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When it comes to Sweden, the government had previously undertaken not to be “indifferent” in the event of a threat or 
attack (Sverker Aström and Magnus Holm, 1997, p. 29). Such a position, also established back in 1997, was understood 
as a commitment to display concrete political solidarity likely to range from condemning diplomatic démarches to joint 
economic sanctions. Therefore, it should by no means be equated with a resolution to surrender time-honoured non-
participation in military alliances (Sverker Aström and Magnus Holm, 1997, p. 72). In this vein, although recognising the 
importance of showing solidarity towards an EU partner in distress, a top-ranking Swedish diplomat commented: “The 
fact that we are no longer politically neutral does not force us to militarily participate in the protection of other countries. 
So, whether Sweden would be able to participate in the operation the answer is, in principle, ‘No’.”(8) That is not to say 
that in the event of a regional conflict afflicting a EU member, Sweden would necessarily issue a declaration of 
neutrality. In this particular instance, the more likely situation would be to see Sweden taking a similar stand to the one 
adopted during the Kosovo war as a non-belligerent country.  
As for Austria, bound to the obligations emanating from the Federal Constitutional Law of Neutrality still in force, the 
country remained bound to the general obligation of non-intervention in armed conflicts (Verdross, 1978, pp. 41-48). 
Tangible signs of Vienna’s seriousness as to the observation of neutrality duties emerged in the summer of 1998 and in 
the spring of 1999. In the context of the Balkan and Kosovo crises, Viktor Klima denied Paris permission to send ships 
down the Danube from Passau to Slovakia, and refused the use of national airspace by NATO planes involved in the 
bombing campaign against Serbia. The Social Democrats’ inclination to favour an Article V protocol, displayed during 
the Cologne Summit preparations, nevertheless, cast a formidable shadow of doubt over their political will to continue 
upholding neutrality obligations.(9) By mid-1999, it remained unclear how Austria would express its ‘mutual solidarity’ 
in the event of an outbreak of hostility between a member state and a third country.  
Along this line of reasoning, during 1995-1999, ‘mutual solidarity’ never stood for ‘mutual territorial defence’ with most 
Austrian, Finnish and Swedish key foreign policy decision-makers. Given this reason alone, the EU’s militarily non-
allied states had real limitations when it came to display ‘mutual solidarity’ in the form of military security guarantees. 
True, the solidarity that they were potentially capable of demonstrating, far from being all-inclusive, was limited by the 
concern of not affecting the essentials of the country’s security policy. Generally speaking, this tended to be originated 
by domestic, political and legal considerations distinctively linked to their security doctrine which continued to be 
founded on military neutrality.  
5. Conclusion   
This article has given a detailed account of how the militarily non-allied states impacted qualitative advances that the 
European foreign and security integration went through between 1995 and 1999. During and after the IGC 96/97, 
pressures to tie up the loose ends left by the Maastricht Treaty regarding CFSP grew considerably. The search for a 
compromise formula became a priority not only for the more integrationist EU members, but especially for the Nordic 
and Alpine states resolved to preserve their security policy specificity. These countries appeared unable and unwilling to 
wrestle for a singularising solution that, besides damaging their image as wholeheartedly committed members, could be 
interpreted as being contradictory to their declared full involvement in the CFSP. In this vein, they were determined not 
to lose face and to not allow themselves to be catapulted into a sort of limbo between full participation in the EU and 
Swiss non-participation.  
Sweden and Finland, while backed up by Austria and Ireland, sought the lowest common denominator amidst diverging 
views on the direction of future CFSP progress: the inclusion of the former WEU Petersberg Tasks into the CFSP realm. 
This was, by far, a formula most compatible with their security policies founded on military non-alliance and 
independent defence. While offering a substantive contribution to the EU security and defence dimensions debate, the so-
called Finnish-Swedish Initiative paved the way for the insertion of a new provision in the Amsterdam Treaty. Under this 
new provision, the former WEU Petersberg Tasks were converted into membership tasks with the possibility of EU 
availing itself of WEU assets and capabilities to carry those missions out.  
Behind the scenes of the political rhetoric, however, the major argument favouring such diplomatic initiative rested 
primarily on the grounds that the proposal offered the possibility of postponing a deeper debate on common defence. In 
any case, by keeping the CFSP centred around the Petersberg Tasks concept, the militarily non-allied states managed to 
rule out the necessity of resorting to an ‘opting out’ strategy that was judged to be detrimental for their image. The 
Petersberg Tasks, officially equated with peacekeeping and humanitarian measures and allowing for a voluntary 
involvement in conformity with constitutional rules, enabled them to square the circle. In other words, it allowed them to 
continue exhibiting their adherence to a military non-allied stance in Stockholm without compromising the political 
solidarity issuing from deepened cooperation with Brussels.  
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Latent tensions connected with participation in future Petersberg peacemaking operations were not unfamiliar to 
militarily non-allied states’ foreign policy decision-makers and security planners. In any case, these did not become the 
major preoccupation, and, in the end, did not prevent the countries under scrutiny to keep pace with progress. It was 
widely understood that the Petersberg Tasks were fundamentally of a humanitarian nature and that they should remain 
so. The perceived likelihood associated with seeing EU involvement in enforcement actions was drastically reduced. In 
the worst-case scenario, there was no doubt that resorting to constructive abstention was a legitimate choice within the 
Petersberg 'menu' founded on self-determination and consensus.  
The Nordics initiated the process of developing EU capability in crisis management without expecting things to develop 
so quickly and in such a short time span. CFSP-related language during IGC negotiations was made stronger in featuring 
‘peace making with combat forces’ as a EU mission in the revised Treaty. Afterwards, London’s complete and 
unanticipated change of heart and the subsequent St. Malo Deal opened the door to military cooperation within the EU.  
Following the entering in force of the Amsterdam Treaty, and influenced by the Kosovo trauma, the militarily non-allied 
members accepted, at the Cologne European Council, the setting-up of a multilateral decision-making framework for the 
carrying out of European crisis management and the building-up of a common ESDP.  
Participation in a Union’s common defence, generally interpreted as potentially comprising mutual territorial defence 
guarantees and European integrated defence forces, however, was consistently rejected for it would have meant the end 
of their policies of non-participation in military alliances. In this vein, mutual solidarity towards other member states was 
only conceivable in strict political and security terms, and could not possibly embrace any military responsibility for 
other members' territorial defence. In contemplating a scenario in which a EU member state was attacked, it was not yet 
certain whether these states would abandon their war and alliance-free security policy orientation to render assistance to a 
partner in distress. The Austrian, Finnish and Swedish authorities tended to converge on non-belligerence as the likely 
maximal stance within the reach of their respective countries’ security strategies. The concept of limited solidarity gained 
expression against this background.  
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Endnotes  
(1) In most texts written in English, the term habitually employed to portray the countries being discussed, even during 
the late 1990s, is ‘neutral’ or 'non-aligned'. The latter can be said to be highly misleading, if not inaccurate, insofar as it 
was originally forged to identify a specific group of countries whose international stance greatly differed from that of 
Austria, Finland and Sweden after 1989. On the other hand, the label ‘militarily non-allied’ is preferable to ‘neutral’, 
which (despite being the term taken from the international law of war) no longer reflects the self-perception of the 
respective countries’ foreign and security policy postures after the Cold War. 
(2)In general, Finns felt that they were let down in the Second World War before the hostile Eastern neighbour. 
Eventually, they survived the military confrontation, although with great human, material and territorial losses. The 
whole experience has, in consequence, created a collective psychological hang-up.
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(4) Interview with Elina Kalkku, Minister Counsellor at the Finnish Mission to NATO and with Antti Satuli, 
Ambassador at the Permanent Representation of Finland to the EU, Brussels, 9 May 2000. 
(5) Interview with an Austrian civil servant, Brussels, May 2000. 
(6) Interview with a senior civil servant of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm, October 2000. 
(7) Interview with a Finnish diplomat, Brussels, May 2000. [Author’s emphasis]. 
(8) Interview with a Swedish diplomat, Brussels, May 2000. 
(9) Evidence that, during the preparatory works leading up to the June 1999 Cologne Summit, Social Democrat 
leadership showed inclination to accept the shaping of an Article V protocol was provided by an Austrian civil servant 
posted in Brussels during an interview conducted in May 2000. 
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